USA and Kosovo: From human rights to independence by Dalipi, Dr. Samet
  Thesis, no.1, 2013  35 
USA and Kosovo: From human rights to 
independence 
Samet Dalipi∗ 
 
Introduction 
 
American intellectual opinion on Kosovo continues to draw significant 
attention from citizens and policymakers of Kosovo. This opinion 
continues to serve as a very important indicator for future 
developments.  The Kosovo public’s attention to the American 
reflections on Kosovo is a result of American pragmatism in the 
affirmation of freedom-loving values and promotion of democracy in 
the world.  
The bloody destruction of the former Yugoslavia produced increased 
attention on the part of the international community, especially the 
United States, on the need to prevent another human tragedy that 
would burden the consciousness of policy makers of the time.  
For ten years, Albanians peacefully resisted Serbian expansionist 
nationalism, but their voice, despite sympathies, did not suffice to 
attract the requisite international attention without having to enter the 
cycle of ethnic violence. 
It appeared that a part of the international community had illusions 
about the longevity of the former federation, in the same way it 
considered finding a solution to the Kosovo issue within the Serbia-
Montenegro remnant, or later, within Serbia.  Nations of the former 
Yugoslav Federation paid their independence price with the loss of 
hundreds of thousands of lives as a consequence of a leadership 
guided by fabricated medieval myths and superstitions after which the 
ideology of Greater Serbia was modeled and on whose vanguard stood 
the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts.   
In this paper, we will present the United States’ official political and 
academic opinion on American policies on Kosovo before, during, and 
after the war.  We will note a substantial evolution of attitude towards 
the resolution of the Kosovo issue.  
 
Keywords: peace building, humanitarian intervention, 
multiculturalism, and humanitarian intervention. 
                                                          
∗ Dr. Samet Dalipi, AAB Universitety, Pristina, E-mail: samet.dalipi@gmail.com 
Samet Dalipi 
36  Thesis, no.1, 2013      
American interest for Kosovo  
 
America's serious commitment to the Balkans was Wilson's legacy1 
set in the "14 points" of January 6, 1918, in which he argued against 
the U.S.’ isolationism in the First World War by citing moral reasons 
and the need to protect the peace in Europe and progressive values. 
Wilson supported an open diplomacy, the right of self-determination2, 
and the creation of the League of Nations, collective security that was 
not based on the balance of power.   
After the Second World War, the U.S.’ influence was crucial in 
efforts to promote the values of democracy against monist dictatorial 
ideologies.  The fall of the iron curtain and communist dictatorships in 
Eastern Europe and the establishment of democracy was the ultimate 
result of the investment of Western democracies, but also unleashed 
nationalism suppressed by monist systems, which led to explosions of 
conflicts that resulted in genocidal acts and human and economic 
destruction.  In this situation, all administrations in Washington over 
the last two decades have been determined to stop human suffering 
caused by wars and to share the burden with the European 
community in reconstructing and establishing peace in the region. 
Furthermore, the U.S. has been caught in a "war" between the 
inviolability of state borders (principle recognized by the UN Charter 
and the Helsinki Act) and the ideal of self-determination that "has 
been widely interpreted as the right of minorities to self-
determination even for state-building”.3  U.S. interest in the Balkans 
after the Second World War followed the cold war dynamics.   
                                                          
1 Lisen Bashkurti, Negotiations, history, theory, practice, Tirana, Geer, 2007, p. 91. 
2 „We believe these fundamental things: first, that every nation has the right 
to choose the sovereignty within which they lived...“ Woodrow Wilson: 
"Address delivered at the First Annual Assemblage of the League to Enforce 
Peace: "American Principles"," May 27, 1916. Online by Gerhard Peters and 
John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency. 
ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=65391. access, 3 February 2012. 
3 Luic Poulain and Ilona Teleki, U.S. Policy Toward the Western Balkans. P.26. at 
ed. Janusz Bugajski, Western Balkans Policy Review 2010.Center for Strategic & 
Internacional Studies, 2010. 
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As interest for Yugoslavia grew due to Tito's hostile policy toward 
Stalin and its neutral attitude towards policy blocks, Albania’s policies 
aggravated relations between the two countries to the extent that the 
U.S. withdrew its diplomatic mission from Tirana (1946) and 
advocated against Albania’s admission in the UN. Since Yugoslavia 
was considered a buffer zone between West and East, American 
policy did not easily accept its disintegration, although things were 
going in that direction. “The EU was confronted with a series of 
violent conflicts in what was then already commonly perceived as its 
“backyard”, and it had little capacities to respond to the crisis. Both 
the wars in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Kosovo were ended after 
international interventions by NATO, which were led by the United 
States”4.  
The Operation Allied Force against the former FRY would not 
have happened without the U.S.’ leading role, but it also signaled that 
most of European allies were willing to use their armies on the 
continent to prevent “humanitarian catastrophes” such as ethnic 
cleansing in their backyard5. Before the war, the U.S. was focused on 
respect for human rights in Kosovo and a status within the former 
Yugoslavia5.  Despite this they had a leading role in the engagement 
of the International Contact Group in dealing with the Kosovo crisis. 
The Group adhered to U.S. official positions on Kosovo’s status 6.  
In March 1998, the U.S. Senate passed a resolution to freeze state 
assets of Serbia-Montenegro. A group of 36 congressmen sent a letter 
to President Clinton, asking him to prepare NATO for a military 
                                                          
4 Abraham M. Verheij, European Union peacebuilding in Kosovo, An analysis of 
dealing with peacebuilding paradoxes and engagement with civil society, 30 
October 2010, Thesis for the Masters Programme “Conflicts, Territories and 
Identities”, p. 3. Radboud University Nijmegen, 2010. 
5 Steven Woehrel, CRS Report for Congress Kosovo and U.S. Policy, June16,1998, 
p. 4, Robert Gelbard, head of mission of U.S. in former Yugoslavia, on May 
6, 1998, said that the United States favors an “advantaged status” within 
FRY, which includes “meaningfull self-administration”. 
6 Ibid.p. 4. 
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intervention in Kosovo7. The UN Security Council Resolution 1199 of 
23 September 1998, and lack of progress on the issues it contained led 
U.S. authorities to affirm a position that it offered sufficient legal basis 
for a NATO military air intervention in resolving the Kosovo issue, 8 
and NATO issued in October an "activation order," authorizing air 
strikes.  Milosevic’s maneuvering that consisted in complying with 
the requirements of resolutions, accepting the Kosovo Verification 
Mission and withdrawing a number of police and army personnel 
from Kosovo resulted only in the suspension of the “order."  Milosevic 
did not honor this agreement, and, on the contrary, he beefed up the 
number of soldiers for a wider operation.  
The UN Security Council Resolution 1160 on the imposition of an 
arms embargo, Resolution 1199 that noted a serious threat to peace in 
the region, and Resolution 1203 on the establishment of the Kosovo 
Verification Mission proved useless in foiling Serbia’s plans over 
Kosovo.  A military intervention by Allied Forces was needed to stop 
Serbian violence.  NATO’s decisive intervention created a climate for 
the adoption of the next resolution, 1244, which despite its flaws, 
created an environment for peace and did not close to the doors to the 
march towards independence. Discussions about the legitimacy of 
intervention in a sovereign and non-NATO states had begun as early 
as the stage of preparations for intervention and continue even now, 
dependent on various international law perspectives.  But the 
opposing voices abated overtime because this was a legitimate act in 
defense of a people from ethnic cleansing.  These voices come from 
                                                          
7 Morton I. Abramowitz, Elliott Abrams, Richard L. Armitage, Nina Bang-
Jensen, Jeffrey Bergner, George Biddle, John R. Bolton, Frank Carlucci, Eliot 
Cohen, Seth Cropsey, Dennis DeConcini, Paula Dobriansky, Morton H. 
Halperin, John Heffernan, James R. Hooper, Bruce P. Jackson, Robert Kagan, 
Zalmay Khalilzad, Lane Kirkland, Jeane Kirkpatrick, Peter Kovler, William 
Kristol, Mark P. Lagon, Richard Perle, Peter Rodman, Gary Schmitt, Stephen 
Solarz, Helmut Sonnenfeldt, William Howard Taft IV, Ed Turner, Wayne 
Owens, Paul Wolfowitz, Dov S. Zakheim. At  
http://www.newamericancentury.org/kosovomilosevicsep98.htm,  access, 
14 tetor 2012. 
8 Ibid.p. 3. 
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countries that have problems with democracy and human rights 
violations.      
U.S. senators and congressmen of both parties 9, the Albanian 
lobby in the U.S., the National Albanian American Council, the LDK 
branch in the U.S. and many societies supportive of Kosovo’s 
independence were instrumental in raising the awareness about 
Kosovo’s issue during the ‘80s and ‘90s.  Friendships with U.S. 
policymakers, Kosovo political class’ clear position on permanent 
friendship with the U.S. and America’s vision of spreading freedom 
and democracy throughout the world made possible the laying of 
seeds of democracy in this part of Europe.  
 
U.S. and Kosovo, after the war  
 
After being placed under international administration, Kosovo was 
supported in all aspects, primarily by western democracies.  After that 
began a phase of reduced American engagement while priority was 
given to European allies in dealing with the issue of Kosovo, but 
without signs of unilateral withdrawal, because as President Bush 
stated during his visit to American KFOR soldiers in Bondsteel, 
Kosovo, on 24 July 2001, "we came together in eastern Europe and will 
go together ... when peace in Kosovo will become self-sustaining”10. 
They have interests regarding the future status of Kosovo, 
including the provision of protection and justice for Albanian and 
Serb populations of Kosovo, encouraging the establishment of a new 
democratic government in Serbia, improving safety and preventing 
unrest in neighboring countries, maintaining NATO's credibility and 
                                                          
9 Dole, Lantosh, Engel, Dioguardi, Biden, Lieberman, McConell, McCain, 
Lugar, Hutchinson, Presler... 
10 President Bush in a long visit to Europe will use the phrase quoted. see: 
Valdet Beqiraj,Bush speech to troops in Camp Bondsteel Kosovo,   
http://kosova.org/post/Bush-speech-to-troops-in-Camp-Bondsteel-
Kosovo.aspx,  access 19 October 2012.  Office of the Press Secretary, June 14, 
2001, Press Conference by President Bush, Prime Minister Goran Persson of 
Sweden. http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/ 
2001/06/20010614-1.html,  access 19 october 2012. 
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cohesion, preventing harmful precedents and unintended 
consequences, holding Western relations with Russia in constructive 
way and limiting the size and duration of the U.S. commitment to the 
implementation of a solution11.  
In the dynamics of global constellations and fluidity of events 
which appear as challenges in international relations, the U.S. and 
world democracies were interested to "get the job done" in the Balkans 
and anchor Europe in calm political waters. And the beginning of 
peace-building efforts did not imply support for independence until 
conditions for dealing with the political status were created.   
Speaking before the Council on Foreign Relations, Madeleine 
Albright stated that NATO's confrontation with Belgrade for Kosovo 
has concluded in conformity with the conditions set by the Alliance.  
“Now, there are some who see an insurmountable obstacle in the 
desire of many Kosovars for immediate independence -- a position 
that neither NATO nor governments in the region support.”12, speaks 
about the current position which can evolve in the future with regard 
to Kosovo’s independence.  At this time, many politicians and 
statesmen circulated an idea that Kosovo would be able to return to 
the previous state given that Serbia was heading towards 
democratization.  Asked about this in an interview, Rugova said, 
"Kosovo will never be part of Serbia, even if Milosevic falls.”13  
In pursuit of peace, at the request of then Swedish Prime Minister, 
Göran Persson, the Independent International Commission on Kosovo 
was established in 1999 to provide an objective analysis of the past 
and current situation and Kosovo’s prospects for its political status. 
The Commission produced two documents in which it preferred as 
the best option that of conditional Independence.   
                                                          
11 Francis T. Miko, CRS Report for Congress, Kosovo’s Future Status: Alternative 
Models, May 26, 1999, p. 2-4.   
12Center on Foreign Affairs, Prepared Remarks by Secretary of State 
Madelaine Albright, June 28, 1999 
http://www.cfr.org/nato/prepared-remarks-secretary-state-madeleine-k-
albright/p3189,  access 2 october 2012. 
13 Associated Press, “Rugova Says Kosovo Will Never Be a Part of Serbia, Even if 
Milosevic Ousted”, 7 August 1999.  
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A second document14 came after the stalemate in transferring 
powers to locals and as a subsequent result came the proposal 
"Standards before Status" by Administrator Michael Steiner.  
The launching of the "Standards before Status" policy by UNMIK 
in 2002 was an attempt to increase awareness in Kosovo and that 
without success achieved in certain areas there would be no progress 
in determining the status of Kosovo, which was a balancing act 
between Kosovo’s demands for accelerating the transfer of powers 
and moving towards final status and Serbia’s demands not to do so.  
The Bush administration strongly supported this policy and in 2003 it 
requested this be given greater importance and set 2005 as the 
deadline for assessing the results of this Strategy.  If Kosovo met the 
standards, the international community should be prepared to launch 
the process of determining the future status of Kosovo, adding that all 
options were on the table. Aforementioned dissatisfactions as well as 
tendencies of political groups trends to present the work of 
institutions such as fruitless also resulted in the events of March 2004 
which the U.S. administration condemned and demanded the return 
of peace.  
Noticing that the developments in Kosovo, particularly the 
reluctance to transfer powers to locals, the inability to build a unified 
system of governance in Kosovo, and that delay of the final status 
determination is fruitless and untenable policy, U.S. policy initiatives 
are again those that began to push the process forward. The Quint 
Group, (U.S., UK, France, Germany, Italy), after "cooling" from the 
1999 intervention, in the interest of arriving easier to solution of the 
Kosovo problem was interested to cooperate with Russia through the 
Contact Group which in 2005 set Kosovo’s final status parameters: 
Kosovo will not return to pre-1999 situation, will not be partitioned, 
                                                          
14 Members of commission were: Richard Goldstone, president, Afrika e 
Jugut, Carl Tham, deputy, Sweden, members: Grâce d’Almeida, Hanan 
Ashrawi, Akiko Domoto, Richard Falk, Oleg Grinevsky Michael Ignatieff, 
Mary Kaldor, Martha Minow, Jacques Rupnik, Theo Sommer, Jan Urban and 
support staff. See at: http://www.kulturserver-hamburg.de/home/ 
illyria/kosovocommission.org_report_english_2001.pdf , access 12 October 
2012. 
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will not create any union with another state 15, proposals that had 
been made by the International Crisis Group, ICG, in its report of 
200516.   
In his testimony before the House International Relations 
Committee in May 2005, Deputy Secretary of State Nicholas Burns 
launched a new policy of "carrying out a duty" in the region.  In 
coordination with the UN and the Contact Group, the United States 
enforced the idea that 2005 was the "year of decision" for Kosovo, 
meaning that the U.S. wanted the launching of the process to 
determine Kosovo's future status. They came to this conclusion given 
that leaving the status question open was untenable and left open the 
possibility for a recurrence of ethnic violence which would undo the 
successes of the U.S. and its allies in the Balkans in building peace and 
establishing democracy and rule of law in the region.  The reached 
agreement would be implemented with the help of the international 
civilian and military presences, and in this respect, the United States 
would want this role to be taken by the EU with the United States as 
an active partner17.  
Congress and the U.S. Senate were very active at this time.  At the 
109th Congress, the issue of Kosovo's status took considerable place.  
Some Congress members18 insisted on independence as soon as 
possible, and some considered that Kosovo has to achieve some of the 
standards beforehand.  In 2005, Tom Lantos proposed a resolution 
(H.Res.24) that called on the U.S. to supports the independence of 
Kosovo.  In September 2005, the Senate adopted a resolution (S.Res. 
237), which requested American engagement in reaching an 
                                                          
15 Guiding Principles of the Contact Group for a Settlement of The Status of Kosovo, 
at: www.unosek.org/docref/Contact%20Group%20%20Ten%20Guiding% 
20principles%20for%20Ahtisaari.pdf, point 6.Access 13 August 2012. 
16 These suggestions are given in paragraph 1b ICG recommendations. See at: 
http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/europe/balkans/kosovo/161-
kosovo-toward-final-status.aspx,  access 12 August 2012. 
17 More at : http://www.state.gov/p/us/rm/2005/46471.htm, access 23 
August 2012. 
18 See more at: Steven Woehrel, CRS Report for Congress Updated, Kosovo's 
Future Status and U.S. Policy.January 9, 2006.  
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agreement on the future status of Kosovo, which would satisfy the 
key concerns of the people of Kosovo and Serbia and Montenegro. 
The Norwegian ambassador to NATO, Kai Aidde, the UN Secretary 
General’s Envoy for assessing progress in meeting standard in 
Kosovo, in his second report proposes to the Secretary-General that 
the process for the future status of Kosovo should begin 19.   
In December 2005, the U.S. administration appointed Ambassador 
Frank Wisner as special representative of the Secretary of State for 
talks on Kosovo's status, while Russia always challenged the West in 
facilitating its independence.  In 2006, the Contact Group had tried to 
leave open the final status of Kosovo in public, but informally the U.S. 
and its allies have told both parties that they will propose 
independence this year20. The Contact Group established a framework 
within which the solution was to be found that included, inter alia, 
that there will be no return to the time before the NATO intervention 
and the solution will satisfy the aspirations of the people of Kosovo 
and preserve the territory of Kosovo. “After a year of negotiations 
between Serbia and Kosovo, President Vladimir Putin's Kremlin 
rejected UN mediator Ahtisaari’s report, which recommended 
supervised independence, prevented the Security Council to receive 
the report and insisted on additional three months of negotiations 
between Serbia and Kosovo, which proved again that compromise 
was impossible”21.  
After the publication of the Ahtisaari Report, in its meeting in 
Germany from 6-8 June 2007, the G-8 accepted the surprising proposal 
of French President Nicolas Sarkozy to continue the talks for another 
four months in an effort to find a solution.  Although supportive, 
                                                          
19 Letter dated 7 October from Secretary-General addressed to the President of 
the Security Council, UN Doc.S/2005/635, 7 tetor 2005.  
20 Morton Abramowitz and James Lyon, Another Balkan high noon, at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2006/oct/24/anotherbalkanhi
ghnoon,  access 27 august 2012.  
21 Morton Abramowitz, Putin's Balkan mischief, The Guardian, 28 Janar 2008 
at http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/jan/28/ 
putinsbalkanmischief,  access 17 September 2012.  
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Russia did not join the G-8 viewing it as a "trap ... cover for automatic 
support the Ahtisaari document after the 120-day deadline"22. 
Even after the second round of negotiations, given that Serbia was 
intent to introduce discussion on its proposal for Kosovo's autonomy, 
but with powers and symbols, which were reserved for sovereign 
states23, positions of the two sides were "very far apart"24.  
Following the publication of the Comprehensive Proposal for the 
Kosovo Status by former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari, the U.S. 
administration supported it as a fair and balanced solution that would 
serve as a basis for a stable, prosperous and multi-ethnic Kosovo and 
invited both sides to accept the plan.  In this regard, the U.S. had 
engaged in urging Serbia to follow the path towards the EU and 
NATO by offering the Partnership for Peace program, and in the 
unification of the international community on the status.   
Realizing that Russia was not on the same wavelength, during his 
visit to Italy and Albania in June 2007, Bush said that, "now is the 
time" and that the end of the process will be Kosovo's independence 
based on the Ahtisaari plan, regardless of additional four months of 
talks.  Russia demanded that any agreement on Kosovo must have 
Serbia’s approval and supported a continuation of negotiations, which 
could continue indefinitely.  Russia intended to introduced divisions 
between Western allies or as Bugajski says, "prevented the alliance 
policy for two reasons: to increase its prestige and influence in the 
Balkans as well as weaken the credibility of NATO's new missions 
designed in Europe "25. 
                                                          
22 Marc Weller, Shtetësia e kontestuar, Administrimi ndërkombëtar i luftës së 
Kosovës për pavarësi, Prishtinë, Koha, 2009.p. 364-5. 
23 Serbian President Tadic, offers to Kosovo access to international financial 
institutions (not the UN, OSCE, EC), flag, anthem, sports representation 
abroad, etc.. See Marc Weller, page 372. 
24 See Report of the Security Council Mission to the issue of Kosovo, UN 
Doc.S/2007/256, May 4, 2007, paragraph 59. 
25 Janusz Bugajski, Facing The Future: The Balkans To The Year 2010, Center for 
European Integration Studies Rheinische Friedrich Wilhelms-Universität 
Bonn, Discussion Paper D 86, 2001. P.17. 
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In this regard, on the eve of the declaration of independence of 
Kosovo, the U.S. special envoy, Frank Wisner, speaking about the 
consequences 26 of the Declaration of Independence, said that, "well-
done things, a clarified political position and Kosovo running its own 
life” were three positive consequences of the event to follow later 
during the week.  As to how will Russia react to the incoming 
declaration of independence; Abramowitz says that, “twill test how 
far we have progressed since the Cold War. Through careful 
management of Kosovo's independence process, and attentiveness to 
opportunities to improve relations with Russia, the west might 
mitigate the worst consequences of this confrontation. Regardless, a 
new Cold War might just get a little colder”.27  With regard to possible 
Russian influence in the period after the declaration of independence, 
Holbrooke believes that, “this time Moscow has been no help at all, 
encouraging Serbia’s stubbornness and declining to help work out an 
arrangement to allow Kosovo a peaceful transition to the 
independence it has been promised by the international 
community.”28   
Since the conditions to approve the Ahtisaari agreement in the UN 
Security Council were not created, after the failure of the second 
round of talks between Serbia and Kosovo delegations, after 
coordinating with Western democracies, Kosovo declared its 
Independence on 17 February 2008.   The U.S. administration 29 and 
most EU countries officially recognized Kosovo as a sovereign and 
independent state one day after the declaration of independence.  
Except for the violent protests in Serbia against Western embassies 
                                                          
26 Frank Wisner, „Russian Opposition to Kosovo Independence 'Unbelievably 
Regrettable', February 12, 2008, at http://www.cfr.org/kosovo/wisner-
russian-opposition-kosovo-independence-unbelievably-regrettable/p15483,  
access 11 August 2012. 
27 Morton Abramowitz, ibid. 
28 Richard C. Holbrooke, Kosovo Independence Declaration Could Spark Crisis, 
interview for The Council on Foreign Relations, December 5, 2007, in 
http://www.cfr.org/kosovo/holbrooke-kosovo-independence-declaration-
could-spark-crisis/p14968,  access 7 January 2012. 
29http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2008/02/ 
20080218-3.html. access 12 September 2012.  
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and in two border crossings with Kosovo, there were no other violent 
acts.   
Based on information the Director of U.S. National Intelligence 
provided to the Committee of the Senate, "Washington has good 
information that the Serbian Government has ordered the police not 
to intervene against protesters who attacked the embassies"30. Given 
the Serbian obstructionism, whose parliament annulled the 
declaration of independence, and support from countries that have 
unresolved internal ethnic problems and with the purpose of 
preventing recognition by other states, Serbia, on 15 August 2008, 
officially asked for the International Court of Justice’s (ICJ) opinion on 
"whether the declaration of independence by the Provisional 
Institutions of Self-Government in Kosovo violates international law?"  
This gave two years to diplomacies of countries who were reluctant 
but also others to recognize Kosovo's statehood.  The ICJ’s reflection 
was as boomerang for the presenters of the question and those who 
supported in this regard. On the occasion of his visit to Kosovo on 21 
May 2009, U.S. Vice President Joseph Biden stated that, "the success of 
an independent Kosovo is a priority for the U.S.”31  
 
Conclusion 
 
U.S. support for Kosovo should be viewed as support for the 
globalization of democracy and respect for individual and collective 
identity and as an effort to stop tyrannies of autocrats in countries 
with democratic deficit.  It had started with revelations of 
contemptuous behavior by Serbian regime against Albanians in 
Kosovo, with humanitarian support and expertise, contribution 
during the military intervention to stop the exodus of the population, 
while it continued after the war with assistance in building 
                                                          
30 http://www.voanews.com/english/news/a-13-2008-03-07-voa19-
66744437.html ,access 12 September 2012. 
31 Bajden speech at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-
By-The-Vice-President-To-The-Assembly-Of-Kosovo/ access 19 September 
2012. 
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democratic institutions and economic development and in 
overcoming political stalemates stemming from the fragility of post-
conflict Kosovo institutions.  U.S. policy toward Kosovo includes 
support from human rights respects to self-determination for the 
people of Kosovo. 
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